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CROSS EXAMINATION UNDER THE
STATUTE
By Charles Rosenbaum, of the Denver Bar
ECTION 376 of the Colorado Code provides that the
testimony of a party to the action or proceeding or a
person for whose immediate benefit the action or proceeding is prosecuted or defended, may be taken at any time
after the service of summons or the appearance of the defendant. This provision of the Code has been in force since
1887.
In 1899, Section 6570 of the 1921 Compiled Laws was
passed. It provides in substance that in a civil action a party
to the record for whose immediate benefit the action or proceeding is prosecuted or defended, or the directors, officers,
superintendent or managing agent of any corporation which
is a party to the record, MAY BE EXAMINED UPON
THE TRIAL THEREOF, as if under cross-examination, at
the instance of the adverse party. The Section further goes
on to provide that the party calling for such examination is
not concluded thereby but may rebut it by counter-testimony.
It will be noted that under the Code, the time when the
deposition may be taken is fixed "at any time after the service
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant", while
under the cross-examination statute it is stated that the adverse
party "may be examined upon the trial thereof". A number
of states, including Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Massachusetts, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Wisconsin and Tennessee, have similar
statutes permitting the adverse party to be called as a witness
in the same manner as other witnesses. Most statutes provide
that the adverse party shall be compelled to testify "as a witness at the trial or by deposition", while others provide that
the examination shall be subject to the rules applicable to the
examination of other witnesses. Because of the limited time,
it is impossible to discuss the decisions in some of these states.
Most of them, however, have been considered by the various
District Judges before whom the question has been argued.
The first case in this district, of which I have been able
to find any definite record, involving the right to take deposi-
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tions before trial as under cross-examination, arose in 1915.
(Whitt v. OrchardProducts Co.). Judge Denison, then sitting as District Judge, held that the deposition of the adverse
party could be taken before trial as under cross-examination.
The question again arose in 1919 (Davis v. Robinson, No.
68054) in a case where the plaintiff, through Edgar McComb
as his counsel, sought to take defendant's deposition as under
cross-examination before trial. The defendant, represented by
N. Walter Dixon, refused to appear for cross-examination
upon the advice of counsel. Judge Hersey, in a lengthy opinion, agreed with Judge Denison, and held the defendant guilty
of contempt. He reasoned as follows: First, that under the
common law, disregarding the statute, one had the right to
cross-examine an adverse or hostile witness (40 Cyc. 2159;
120 N. W. 264) and Since the deposition could be taken before
trial under the Code, such deposition might properly be taken
as under cross-examination. Those taking the other side of
the question argue that the foregoing reasoning does not apply
because the cross-examination statute was passed after the
Code provision and the later statute should therefore govern,
in determining the intention of the legislature. This argument
may be answered by calling attention to the Decision of our
Supreme Court in Purse v. Purcell, 43 Colo. 50 at 53, which
holds that our cross-examination statute does not abridge any
right which a party had at common law. Judge Hersey held,
second, that the cross-examination statute was remedial in
character and therefore was entitled to a liberal construction
for the purpose of accomplishing the object sought to be obtained thereby. Third, that under the common law (40 Cyc.
2473) and under the Code, the time at which a party might
examine his adversary was within the discretion of the trial
Court.
In 1926 the question again arose before Judge Butler,
sitting as District Judge in the case of Lednum v. Lednum
(No. 90503). In that case Judge Butler in a written opinion,
after having read Judge Hersey's opinion, stated that although
he entertained a very high regard for Judge Hersey he could
not agree with him and that the words "upon the trial", meant
upon the trial and not before the trial and that any other construction was not liberal but was doing violence to the plain
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language of the statute. There are numerous decisions which
hold that the proceedings, motions, arguments and pleadings
prior to the taking of evidence in Court are no part of a trial
in its generally accepted meaning. (Lipscomb v. State, 76
Miss. 253; Hunnell v. State, 86 Ind. 431 ; State v. Hazledahl,
2 N. Dak. 521; Wagner v. State, 42 Ohio State 537; Ward v.
Territory, 8 Okla. 25. See also "Trial", Webster's New Internat. Dictionary, 1918).
Judge Butler went on to state, however, that in his opinion the importance of the cross-examination statute has been
over-estimated for the reason that under the Code the adverse
party could be subpoenaed and examined as a hostile or adverse witness. This right, in his opinion, included practically
all the benefits to be gained by the cross-examination statute.
He goes on to point out that the only fundamental difference
between the examination of an adverse witness and the crossexamination of a witness under the statute is that in the former
case evidence might not be permitted attacking the general
reputation of the adverse party for truth and veracity, whereas
under the statute the party calling his opponent for crossexamination would not be precluded from attacking his general reputation. In other respects the party calling the adverse party would not be concluded or bound by his testimony
but could call other witnesses to contradict him. (Brown v.
Tourtelotte, 24 Colo. at 216; C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Roberts, 35
Colo. 501; Pacific Life Co. v. Van Fleet, 47 Colo.-at 405).
From a practical standpoint, if information is all that is
desired by the deposition and the party taking the deposition
does not desire to be bound, even to the extent of being precluded from introducing testimony attacking the general reputation of the adverse party, he may proceed to take the deposition and need not introduce it in evidence, in which event
he is not bound by the deposition.
Upon inquiry I am advised that three District Judges
outside of our own District, have taken the position that the
deposition can be taken before trial as under cross-examination. In our own District, viz. Denver, all of the District
Judges have ruled on the proposition except Judge Steele.
With the exception of Judge Holland, they have followed
Judge Butler's decision in the Lednum case and have refused
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to permit the depositions to be taken as under cross-examination. Judge Holland, on the other hand, agreeing with Judges
Denison and Hersey before him, has permitted the taking of
the deposition as under cross-examination, and in addition to
the reasoning expounded by Judge Hersey, takes the position
that the purpose of both the Code and the Statute is to permit
the adverse party to get the facts before trial and that he
should be given every opportunity to do so. He says that if
the witness called is forced to divulge any fact that the other
party is entitled to, justice has been done and the intention
of the Legislature carried out. He takes the position that in
his opinion it was not the intention of the Legislature by the
statute to handicap the party desiring to take the deposition,
even to the extent of being unable to impeach the general reputation of his adversary.
In connection with the cross-examination statute an interesting question arose sometime ago before Judge Sackmann,
in a suit involving fraud, in which exemplary damages was
asked. (Hart v. Hammond). It involved the right, upon
the trial, to call the defendant for cross-examination under the
statute. There is authority to the effect that the privilege
of a witness not to furnish evidence which might incriminate
him, is not limited merely to a criminal proceeding but that
it can be invoked in a civil proceeding in which a penalty
(based on a non-remedial statute) is asked, or where the testimony of the witness might tend to prove an offense punishable
as a crime.
A number of decisions have held that where the purpose
of a suit is to recover a penalty, the defendant cannot be compelled to testify. (29 L. R. A. 811). In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 at 563, the Supreme Court of the United
States says:
"It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a witness shall not
be compelled in any proceedings to make disclosures or to give evidence which

will tend to criminate him, or subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures."

Both the Supreme Court of the United States and our
own Supreme Court have stated that the object of the constitutional provision was not merely for the protection of the
individual in a criminal prosecution against himself, but its
purpose was to insure that a person could not be required
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when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime. (Tuttle v. People, 33 Colo. 243 at 254).
Our Supreme Court, as you know, has held that exemplary damages are penal in character. (French v. Dean, 19
Colo. 504; Ristine v. Blocker, 15 Colo. App. 224 at 230).
Judge Sackmann accordingly held that since the answers
of the defendant called for cross-examination, might subject
him to a penalty, viz. exemplary damages, such defendant
could not be compelled to testify. This same reasoning would,
of course, apply in a suit in which fraud or similar facts, constituting a crime are sought to be elicited.
There is some question whether a dicta of our Supreme
Court in Radinsky v. People, 66 Colo. 179 at 183, does not
indicate a contrary view.
In that case plaintiff refused to testify before the grand
jurv because it might prejudice his interests in an election
contest. Our Supreme Court said:
"One is not relieved of the duty to testify in preliminary examinations,
or before grand juries, or in criminal cases, merely because such testimony may
have a tendency to influence claims made by him in civil actions. (Citing

Cases).
"Furthermore, under our statute, his adversary may require him to
answer, as upon cross-examination, in such actions."

Since preparing these remarks, I have been advised that
the first question discussed by me is now being taken to the
Supreme Court. (Taylor v. Briggs, et al., No. 12937).
No doubt the decision in this case will clarify the controversial question discussed in this article.

BAR POLL UPON PROHIBITION
At a meeting of the Denver Bar Association held May 2,
1932, the following resolution was adopted:
BE IT RESOLVED by The Denver Bar Association that a written
poll of the membership be forthwith taken to determine the sentiment of the
Association upon the following alternatives:
1. For continuance and enforcement of the existing prohibition laws.
2. For repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and laws passed in
pursuance thereof.

